STUPID-2026-0151
A security researcher found 16 vulnerabilities — including inverted access-control logic — in a Lovable-generated EdTech app, exposing 18,697 users' records and letting anyone delete accounts or grade exams
Why 8/10
One live app's production data was exposed, including full PII for 870 users and email addresses for nearly 15,000 more — many credentials, but confined to a single app rather than platform-wide. The researcher demonstrated access to real, live user data (not a test environment); whether anyone besides the researcher took data before Lovable's response is not established, so loss is scored as not fully confirmed rather than irreversible-and-confirmed.
- Scope
- 3/4
- A whole machine or drive, an organisation's production system or data, or many credentials
- Recoverability
- 2/3
- Partly lost, or loss reported without saying whether it was recovered
- Did it happen
- 2/2
- Happened in real use
- Beyond the user
- 1/1
- Production systems, customers or third parties, or credentials and sensitive personal data
The score is the sum of these four factors. How each factor is scored · scored 2026-10-31
Instruction given
Not a single developer's prompt to an agent — the flaw lived in the AI-generated backend of an exam-question and grading app that Lovable itself featured on its public Discover showcase, built through Lovable's standard app-generation flow on a Supabase backend.
Expected behavior
Restrict administrative functions and other users' records to authorized, authenticated accounts; an unauthenticated visitor should have no access to protected data or destructive actions.
Actual behavior
Security researcher Taimur Khan found that a remote procedure call function meant to block non-admin users from sensitive functions instead did the opposite: it blocked every logged-in user while letting unauthenticated requests through. Khan said the same inverted-logic error recurred across multiple critical functions in the app, which had no Supabase row-level security or role-based access control implemented at all. The app had logged over 100,000 views and about 400 upvotes on Lovable's own Discover page before Khan's disclosure.
Damage
Khan found 16 vulnerabilities in total, six rated critical, exposing 18,697 user records — 14,928 of them with unique email addresses, including 4,538 student accounts and 10,505 enterprise users, with 870 users' full PII exposed. Per Khan's findings, an unauthenticated attacker could read every user record, send bulk emails through the platform, delete user accounts, grade students' exam submissions, and reach organizations' admin emails. Affected users reportedly included people from UC Berkeley and UC Davis, and possibly K-12 minors. Khan says he first reported the issue through Lovable's support, where the ticket was closed without response; Lovable told The Register it received "a proper disclosure report" on the evening of February 26, 2026 and acted "within minutes." Lovable CISO Igor Andriushchenko said every project includes a free pre-publish security scan but that acting on its recommendations is "at the discretion of the user," and noted the project also contained code Lovable did not generate and a database Lovable does not host. Lovable said it had contacted the app's creator, who was "now addressing the issue" as of publication; no independent confirmation of a fix is reported, and whether anyone besides Khan accessed the exposed data is not established.
Full write-up
Security researcher Taimur Khan disclosed 16 vulnerabilities, six of them critical, in an exam-question and grading app built on Lovable, the "vibe-coding" platform, and featured on Lovable's own Discover showcase. The app had racked up more than 100,000 views and roughly 400 upvotes before Khan began probing it.
The most serious flaw was an inverted access-control check: a remote procedure call meant to keep non-admin users out of sensitive functions instead blocked every authenticated user while letting unauthenticated requests straight through. Khan found the same inversion repeated across several critical functions, and the app had no working Supabase row-level security or role-based access control at all.
The exposure reached 18,697 user records — 14,928 of them tied to a unique email address, including 4,538 student accounts and 10,505 enterprise users, with 870 users' full personal information exposed. Per Khan's account, an unauthenticated attacker could have read every one of those records, sent bulk emails through the platform, deleted accounts outright, graded students' real exam submissions, and reached organizations' admin emails. Affected users reportedly included people from UC Berkeley and UC Davis, and possibly minors in K-12 programs.
Khan says his first report, filed through Lovable's own support channel, was closed without a response. Lovable told The Register it received "a proper disclosure report" on the evening of February 26, 2026, and acted "within minutes" of that. Lovable's CISO, Igor Andriushchenko, said every project built with Lovable includes a free security scan before publishing, but that implementing its recommendations is "at the discretion of the user," and pointed out that the project included code Lovable did not generate and a database Lovable does not host. Lovable said it had since contacted the app's creator, who was "now addressing the issue." No independent confirmation that the flaw was fixed has been reported, and there is no public record of whether anyone besides Khan accessed the exposed data during the window it was live.
Classification
- Agent
- Lovable
- Failure mode
- Security Vulnerability
- Root cause
- Logic Error
- Domain
- Backend
- MIT AI Risk Repository (our mapping)
- 2.2 AI system security vulnerabilities and attacks · 2.1 Compromise of privacy by leaking or correctly inferring sensitive information taxonomy
- Source
- Security Research
Related incidents
Cite this record
StupidLLM. "STUPID-2026-0151: A security researcher found 16 vulnerabilities — including inverted access-control logic — in a Lovable-generated EdTech app, exposing 18,697 users' records and letting anyone delete accounts or grade exams." AI Agent Incident Database, 2026. https://www.stupidllm.com/incident/STUPID-2026-0151/ (accessed 2026-10-31). CC BY 4.0.
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